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Abstract.  The principle of formal equality, one of the most 
fundamental and undisputed principles in ethics, states that a 
difference in treatment or value between two kinds of entities 
can only be justified on the basis of a relevant and significant 
difference between the two. Accordingly, when it comes to the 
question of what kind of moral claim an intelligent or 
autonomous machine might have, one way to answer this is by 
way of comparison with humans: Is there a fundamental 
difference between humans and machines that justifies unequal 
treatment, or will the two become increasingly continuous, thus 
making it increasingly dubious whether unequal treatment is 
justified? This question is inherently imprecise, however, 
because it presupposes a stance on what it means for two types 
of entities to be sufficiently similar, as well as which types of 
properties that are relevant to compare. In this paper, I will 
sketch a formal characterization of what it means for two types 
of entities to be continuous in this sense, discuss what it implies 
for two different types of entities to be (dis-)continuous with 
regard to both ethics and science, and discuss a dramatic 
difference in how two previously discontinuous entities might 
become continuous.1 
1 INTRODUCTION2 
The concept of ‘continuity’ has been championed by MIT 
historian Bruce Mazlish, who claims that progress in science and 
technology will inevitably result in a fourth continuity between 
man and machine [1]. According to Mazlish, there have been 
three dramatic scientific revolutions in the history of mankind, 
and these revolutions are best described as the establishment of 
continuities; mankind has generally come to acknowledge that 
there is no sharp discontinuity between our planet and the rest of 
the universe (Copernican revolution), between humans and 
animals (Darwinian revolution), nor between rational and 
irrational humans (Freudian revolution). Mazlish argues that we 
should also overcome what he terms the fourth discontinuity; 
that there is no sharp discontinuity between humans and 
machines.  
There are a number of problems with Mazlish’s account, 
however. First, it is difficult to discern precise criteria for what it 
means for something to become continuous, which means that 
we seemingly operate with inconsistent conceptions of 
continuity. A clear example of this can be seen with regard to 
animal experiments. On the one hand, animal researchers 
presuppose a continuity between humans and animals – if not, 
the results would not be relevant to humans. On the other hand, 
they also presuppose a discontinuity – if not, the experiments 
would be unethical. It is clear from this example that we often 
regard two types of entities as continuous in one respect and 
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discontinuous in another. Thus, we need to clarify what these 
different ‘respects’ are, and how they relate to each other. 
Mazlish seems to claim that a continuity is determined by 
whether or not the inner workings of two entities can be 
explained within the same scientific framework, such as 
computationalism being able to explain both computers and the 
human brain. Although there are numerous problems with 
Mazlish’s approach, which I will return to below, one if its 
advantages is that it takes an epistemological rather than 
ontological approach to the moral status debate – an approach 
that in many ways mirrors Alan Turing’s well-known approach 
to the question of whether machines can be intelligent [2].  
2 FOLLOWING TURING’S LEAD  
For the present audience, I presuppose that it is not necessary to 
explain the Turing test as a means of judging whether a 
computer is intelligent enough, but in short Turing argues that a 
computer is to be regarded as intelligent if a human judge cannot 
reliably distinguish the computer from the human in an imitation 
game. What is important here is that Turing turns the question of 
intelligence from an ontological to an epistemological one. That 
is, Turing does not ask which properties a computer must 
possess in order to be deemed intelligent (which is an 
ontological question), but rather how an intelligent observer 
judges its behaviour. The latter is a type of epistemological 
question, where we are really asking what kind of explanatory 
framework we need to presuppose in order to understand a 
particular type of behaviour. If a computer were to pass the 
Turing test, this means that the judge had to explain its 
behaviour as coming from an intelligent being, which says 
nothing about which properties that being must have (other than 
being able to display the behaviour in question). Notice that this 
approach is radically different from the typical approach to 
questions of moral status and the like, where we typically discuss 
which properties an entity must possess in order to be regarded 
as a moral person (e.g. sentience[3], conception of one’s own life 
[4], or having a will to live [5]).3 [6] 
In a similar manner, Mazlish argues (indirectly) that two 
types of entities should be regarded as continuous if they do not 
require different scientific frameworks; if the same framework of 
scientific concepts and models can adequately explain the 
phenomenon under study. On this background, the Copernican 
revolution was really a realization that we do not need different 
scientific frameworks for the earth and the heavens (as was the 
case with the Aristotelian framework), the Darwinian revolution 
was a realization that we do not need different scientific 
frameworks for humans and other animals, and the Freudian 
revolution was a realization that we do not need different 
scientific frameworks for the mentally ill and the mentally 
healthy. Mazlish’s prophesized fourth continuity, then, is the 
realization that we do not need different scientific frameworks 
for computers and humans either. Thus, all of these continuities 
amount to radical changes in how to explain different types of 
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entities (epistemological), rather than saying that all the entities 
have the same properties and/or mode of existence (ontological). 
Just like Turing thought an epistemological approach to the 
question of machine intelligence was more fruitful than an 
ontological one, I will take a similar approach to the question of 
continuity in the remainder of this paper. In doing so, I first need 
to make some important changes to Mazlish’s approach, which 
despite its advantages gives rise to some fundamental problems. 
3 PROBLEMS WITH A SINGLE-LEVEL 
APPROACH TO ‘CONTINUITY’ 
As mentioned, Mazlish seems to claim that a continuity is 
determined by whether or not the inner workings of two entities 
can be explained within the same scientific framework, for 
instance the same physics being able to explain both the earth 
and the heavens, behaviourism being able to explain both 
humans and other animals, psychoanalysis being able to explain 
both mental health and illness, and computationalism being able 
to explain both computers and the human brain. This is what I 
refer to as a single-level approach, for reasons I will explain in 
more detail below. 
 This approach is problematic for two related reasons. First, 
anything can be explained within the same scientific framework. 
Disregarding supernatural and/or substance dualist accounts, it is 
probably possible in principle to explain the workings of the 
human brain and a computer by physics alone – and if we 
believe in scientific progress, our ability to do so will increase in 
time with progress in physics (I will return to this below). 
Second, anything can be explained as if it is an intentional 
agent, as also argued by Daniel Dennett, who refers to this as 
taking an intentional stance  [7]. Since Mazlish does not specify 
how strict we need to be when claiming that the same scientific 
framework can explain two types of entities, his approach 
becomes inherently imprecise. If it is sufficient that it is in 
principle possible to explain something within the same 
framework, then every existing entity is continuous as long as 
there is no phenomena that cannot in principle be explained by 
some kind of physics. This would entail that humans are 
continuous with light bulbs, supernovae and clouds, which 
leaves the concept of little use. It seems more reasonable, then, 
to refer to some kind of pragmatism where it must not only be 
in-principle possible but also pragmatically feasible to explain 
two entities within the same framework. But, this would require 
some kind of measure for what it means to be pragmatically 
feasible. Is it, for instance, pragmatically feasible to explain the 
brain fully in terms of physical processes, or do we (also) need to 
invoke chemistry? 
Some of these problems are difficult to escape, since it is hard 
to provide objective criteria for when a particular scientific 
framework ceases to be feasible. However, we can try to remedy 
the problem of explanations at different levels by explicitly 
invoking this into the conception of continuity. In the following 
section, I will sketch such a multi-level account of continuity. 
 
Before outlining this multi-level account allow me to emphasize 
that my main concern in this paper is to discuss the formal nature 
of these continuities, so it is important to emphasize that the 
levels of explanation that I will use as examples below are to be 
seen as mere placeholders and the reader will inevitably find 
some of them problematic and/or imprecise. My goal is to first 
work out the formal schematics, and then the more substantial 
content should be worked out in more detail. This will, among 
other things, require a defence of a particular type of realism and 
view on scientific progress, both of which fall well beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
4 A MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH TO 
‘CONTINUITY’ 
Rather than asking whether two types of entities can be 
explained within the same scientific framework, I believe it is 
better to approach this in terms of sets of scientific frameworks – 
or what I will refer to as sets of scientific levels of explanation. 
That is, rather than asking whether two entities can be explained 
within the same scientific framework, we should ask whether 
two entities require the same set of scientific levels of 
explanation. As Nagel [8] rightly argues, there are (at least) four 
fundamentally different types of explanation – deductive, 
probabilistic, teleological, and genetic – which makes it difficult 
to precisely define what a scientific level of explanation is. For 
present purposes, I will simply use the term in the more generic 
sense of a more or less coherent and mutually supportive set of 
principles, concepts and models that attempt to provide an 
account of the relationships between cause and effect.4  
As mentioned, one of the problems with Mazlish’s single-
level approach, where continuity is established on the basis of a 
notion of sharing one scientific framework, is that we often 
choose different levels of explanation (or, to use Luciano 
Floridi’s term, levels of abstraction [9]) depending on what it is 
that we seek to explain. Even if it is in-principle possible to 
explain human behaviour by physics alone, we typically employ 
higher-level explanations instead. For instance, at a behaviourist 
level of explanation, we employ concepts like stimulus and 
response to explain behaviour, without involving physics or 
chemistry. Even for entirely physicalist phenomena, such as an 
object moving through space, we often employ heuristics instead 
of explaining what is “really” going on. As such, the science of 
ballistics can be seen as a form of higher-level heuristics for 
explaining how an object moves through space without talking 
about the complex interplay between electrons and force fields. 
This, along with the other problems with a single-level approach 
mentioned above, entails that we cannot define a continuity in 
terms of a shared scientific framework. A much more promising 
approach is to define continuity in terms of having a particular 
set of scientific levels of explanation in common. 
To simplify things, if we take a single-celled organism, we 
may be able to explain its functioning entirely in terms of 
physics.5 As we get to more complex forms of life, however, 
such explanations quickly become untenable. At some point, the 
chemistry involved becomes too complex to be described in 
physics terms alone. At even higher levels of complexity, 
chemistry also fails to provide a full explanation and we need to 
start talking about biological processes and leave the actual 
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physical and chemical processes out of our explanations. At even 
higher levels, we may need to involve the environment and 
cognitive processes to a much higher extent, and start using 
principles from, say, behaviourism and comparative psychology. 
With humans, as evidenced by the widespread criticism and 
dismissal of radical behaviourism in the mid-1900s, we could 
also make the case that we need some kind of mental, 
phenomenological or folk-psychological level of explanation 
that cannot be reduced to any of the other levels. At even higher 
supraindividual levels, we may also require social, cultural and 
other value-laden levels of explanation – and we find ourselves 
far away from the original physicalist level. Which levels we 
may need in order to adequately explain a given entity is clearly 
controversial, and not my concern in this paper, but only the 
most radical and optimistic scientists maintain that we will in the 
foreseeable future be able to explain everything by means of one 
unified theory. On the basis of all this, it seems evident that if we 
are to define continuity in terms of which type of explanation is 
required, we must talk about sets of levels of explanation (multi-
level) instead of Mazlish’s single-level scientific frameworks.  
On this background, we can stipulate the preliminary 
hypothesis: two types of entities are continuous if and only if an 
adequate understanding of their nature and properties require the 
same set of scientific levels of explanation; two types of entities 
are discontinuous if and only if an adequate understanding of 
their nature and properties does not require the same set of 
scientific levels of explanation. To illustrate, humans and other 
animals are continuous if and only if a full understanding of their 
nature and properties require the same set of scientific levels of 
explanation (LoE).6 These definitions still lack a lot of precision, 
however, and we need to first specify what is meant by 
‘required’. 
4 EPISTEMOLOGICAL VS ONTOLOGICAL 
CONTINUITY 
There are two radically different ways in which a LoE may be 
required for an adequate understanding. On the one hand, we 
could for instance argue that the human brain works in such a 
way that we cannot adequately understand its functioning 
without employing a chemical level of explanation. Perhaps the 
chemical properties of neurotransmitters and hormones function 
in a way that cannot possibly be accounted for by means of more 
mechanistic explanations – which would be an anti-reductionist 
view of chemistry. If such a chemical LoE is required because of 
the brain’s unique mode of existence, then that LoE is required 
for ontological reasons.  
On the other hand, we could argue that the human brain works in 
such a way that it is much more convenient or tractable to use a 
chemical LoE, even if such an explanation can in principle be 
reduced to a more basic LoE. If we, despite this in-principle 
possibility, do require a chemical LoE for pragmatic reasons, 
then that LoE is required for epistemological reasons. 
In light of the above, we can already differentiate between an 
ontological and epistemological continuity: 
 
Ontological continuity: two types of entities are 
ontologically continuous if and only if an adequate 
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understanding of their nature and properties require the same set 
of scientific levels of explanation in principle, due to their mode 
of existence. 
 
Epistemological continuity: two types of entities are 
epistemologically continuous if and only if an adequate 
understanding of their nature and properties require the same set 
of scientific levels of explanation in practice. 
 
To illustrate, humans and other animals are ontologically 
continuous if and only if a full understanding of their nature and 
properties require the same set of scientific levels of explanation 
in principle. Humans and other animals are epistemologically 
continuous if and only if a full understanding of their nature and 
properties require the same set of scientific levels of explanation 
in practice. It is far from uncontroversial which LoEs are 
ontologically or epistemologically necessary for an adequate 
understanding (as well as what is to be meant by ‘adequate’), 
and it is far beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this for 
different types of entities, but this question maps directly on to 
the reductionism debates present in the different disciplines. In 
philosophy of mind, a property dualist would hold that 
consciousness is somehow ontologically irreducible to 
neurobiology and physics – which means that a “higher” LoE is 
ontologically necessary for a full understanding of a conscious 
being. Eliminiative materialism, on the other hand, holds that 
consciousness can and should be explained at a neuroscientific 
LoE, thus claiming that higher LoEs (folk psychology, in 
particular) are not ontologically necessary for a full 
understanding of conscious beings. If we compare humans and 
other animals, the former would hold that conscious animals are 
ontologically discontinuous from non-conscious animals, 
whereas the latter would hold that conscious animals are 
ontologically continuous with non-conscious animals. Non-
reductive physicalism, however, holds that conscious states 
really are the same as physical states and that the former can in 
principle be explained by the latter – but not in practice. 
According to such a view conscious beings would be 
epistemologically discontinuous from non-conscious beings. 
5 THE SCHEMATICS OF CONTINUITIES 
In light of the considerations above, we can now attempt to 
schematize what a continuity might look like, according to this 
multi-level approach. Consider the following schematic: 
 
Type of entity 
Required LoE 
Humans Other animals 
Psychological X  
Behaviorist X X 
Physical X X 
 
In this example, humans require a physical, behaviourist and a 
psychological LoE for a full understanding, whereas other 
animals can be fully understood by physical and behaviourist 
LoEs alone. If this is the case, then humans would be 
discontinuous with other animals. If the psychological LoE is 
required in principle this is an ontological discontinuity, if 
required only in practice this is an epistemological discontinuity. 
To more clearly show the difference with Mazlish’s single-level 
approach, consider the following:  
Type of entity 
Required LoE 
Humans Intelligent 
machines 
Psychological X  
Computational X X 
Physical X X 
 
In this example, humans are discontinuous with machines 
because they require a psychological LoE, whereas machines can 
be fully understood without. Again, this would be an ontological 
discontinuity if the computational and physical LoEs are not 
sufficient for a full understanding of humans (which entails some 
type of dualism). It would be an epistemological discontinuity if 
the psychological LoE is only required for pragmatic reasons 
(which entails some type of non-reductive materialism). Note 
that Mazlish’s single-level approach is unable to account for this, 
and would treat humans and machines, in this example, as 
continuous as long as the computational LoE somehow explains 
both. 
Putting this together, the multi-level account of continuity 
ultimately suggests some kind of hierarchy when it comes to 
discontinuities: 
 
Type of entity 
 
Required LoE 
Humans Other 
animals 
Intelligent 
machines 
Other 
inanimate 
objects 
Psychological X    
Behaviorist X X   
Computational X X X  
Physical X X X X 
 
Now we are able to describe the aforementioned problem of 
animal experimentation seemingly being an inconsistent practice 
since it presupposes both a radical similarity (scientific validity) 
and radical difference (ethical justifiability) between humans and 
other animals. The scientific validity of such experiments can be 
grounded in the fact that the LoEs that are relevant for the 
scientific validity are shared, whereas the LoEs that are relevant 
for the ethical justifiability are not shared.  
This further illustrates how one purpose of establishing 
discontinuities in this manner is to map their required LoE onto a 
classification of moral status (or moral worth). That is, there are 
different ways to harm entities corresponding to their required 
LoE. In a manner of speaking, the more LoEs that are required 
for understanding an entity, the more ways there are to harm that 
entity. At a physical level, we may speak of a minimal harm in 
terms of entropy, at a computational level we may be able to 
speak of a minimal harm to self-sustainability, at a behaviourist 
level we are dealing with harms in terms of rewards and 
punishment, i.e. infliction of pain and pleasure, and at a 
psychological LoE it should be evident that the harms become 
much more complex, including things related to offense, liberty, 
dignity, privacy, self-actualization, and so forth.  
 
Another important purpose of this schematization is to include 
Freud’s notion of scientific progress changing our conception of 
ourselves in dramatic ways: “the universal narcissism of men, 
their self-love, has up to the present suffered three severe blows  
from the researches of science” [10]. I will refer to such blows as 
downgrading as opposed to upgrading continuities, which also 
further illustrates what is meant by LoEs being required in 
principle and in practice.  
6 DOWNGRADING VS UPGRADING 
CONTINUITIES 
It follows from the notion of LoEs being only epistemologically 
necessary that scientific progress will bring about changes in 
which levels that are necessary to explain a given entity – which 
is reflected in the scientific ideals of parsimony, unification and 
reduction. This means that two types of entities previously seen 
as discontinuous may become continuous. That is, two types of 
entities that previously required different sets of LoE, at some 
point may end up requiring the same set of LoE. According to 
these schematics, this can come about in two different ways – 
which correspond to two radically different ways in which 
science may change our worldview, and where we can more 
precisely conceptualize Freud’s notion of blows to the self-
esteem of mankind.  
First, we may come to realize that a type of entity no longer 
requires an LoE that we previously thought to be necessary – for 
instance when we are able to successfully reduce one scientific 
LoE to a more fundamental one. When two types of entities 
come to share the same set of LoE because one type loses a LoE, 
this amounts to a downgrading continuity. More schematically: 
 
Type of entity 
Required LoE 
Humans Other animals 
Psychological X  
Behaviorist X X 
Physical X X 
 
This was precisely the concern when Skinner’s radical 
behaviourism aspired to explain both humans and other animals 
entirely in terms of behaviourist principles. This would, 
according to this line of reasoning, entail a continuity between 
humans and other animals because humans would no longer 
require an additional LoE. In a manner of speaking, this would 
downgrade humans to the level of animals. We can see the same 
concern when it comes to intelligent machines: 
 
Type of entity 
Required LoE 
Humans Intelligent 
machines 
Psychological - X  
Computational X X 
Physical X X 
In this case, humans would become continuous with intelligent 
machines because they come to share the same set of LoEs due 
to the loss of one LoE. In a manner of speaking, this does not 
only amount to humans and computers being “the same”, but 
that “humans are nothing but machines”.  
There is a converse way of becoming continuous, however. 
Consider the following: 
 
Type of entity 
Required LoE 
Humans Intelligent 
machines 
Psychological X + X 
Behaviorist X + X 
Computational X X 
Physical X X 
 
In this case, humans and intelligent machines become continuous 
because the latter attain new LoEs. That is, intelligent machines 
might become so complex that we can no longer explain their 
function by means of computational principles alone. At some 
point we may need to adopt psychological principles to explain 
intelligent machines as well, not only metaphorically but as an 
in-practice (epistemological) or in-principle (ontological) 
requirement for explaining intelligent machine behaviour. This is 
what I refer to as an upgrading continuity, where two types of 
entities come to share the same set of LoEs due to one gaining a 
new LoE. Indeed, we can say that artificial intelligence has at 
least taken one important step towards making the sets similar, 
since highly advanced neural networks now require behaviourist 
notions in order to be explained. That is, if we want to explain 
exactly how a successful, complex neural network functions, we 
have to do so in terms of how the network was subjected to 
conditioning – a purely computational account of the weights of 
the nodes etc will often be incapable of explaining exactly how 
the network actually generates its output. Thus, even if there are 
good reasons to maintain a discontinuity between humans and 
machines, the necessity of a behaviourist LoE for explaining 
highly complex computers, neural networks and embedded 
systems in particular, entails that we can already now speak of 
an (epistemological) continuity between machines and non-
human animals; they have come to share the same set of LoEs 
due to computers now requiring a behaviorist LoE 
7 PROBLEMS WITH THE APPROACH 
Needless to say, this approach is fraught with problems. Allow 
me to repeat that my only concern in this paper has been to 
sketch one possible formalization of ‘continuity’ and a lot of this 
has to be augmented by a particular conception of what a 
scientific (level of) explanation is, which will among other 
things have to rest on a particular stance in the realism debate. 
Indeed, the account sketched above presupposes some notion of 
scientific realism (I am leaning towards some form of structural 
realism) but should also be compatible with more pragmaticist 
notions of science as well. It also presupposes some idea of 
scientific progress – i.e. that science, through the development 
and elimination of LoEs, is providing us with an increasingly 
accurate picture of reality. That said, I certainly do not rule out 
the possibility of dramatic paradigm shift, but I think this can be 
accounted for within this conception of continuity as well. 
Indeed, a continuity between intelligent machines and humans 
may require a paradigm shift that obliterates our current LoEs – 
for instance if we arrive at some quantum mechanical LoE that 
allows us to explain consciousness and build conscious 
machines.  
There are numerous other problems, primarily related to lack of 
precision, when it comes to most of the terms involved. This 
concerns, among other things, what it means to ‘adequately’ 
explain something, how to delineate precise levels of 
explanation, as well as some threshold for when a level ought to 
be seen as epistemologically and/or ontologically necessary. I 
hope to develop all of this further as soon as the formal 
schematics are in place, with the help of peer feedback from 
different backgrounds. 
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I can only hope that this paper was read in the spirit intended – 
as an initial, exploratory and formal account of what it means for 
two types of entities to be (dis-)continuous. There is no doubt 
that that the details, if we can even agree on the formal nature, 
will require a lot of clarification. My only hope for this paper 
was that the reader, like myself, will on occasion find the notion 
of continuity an intuitively helpful concept – along with the 
distinctions between epistemological vs ontological and 
downgrading vs. upgrading continuities. I am also certain that 
the reader, like myself, will not be satisfied with the current level 
of precision, and I would certainly appreciate any help towards 
improving this. Judging from experience, the IACAP crowd is an 
excellent starting point to this effect. 
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